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Introduction
Promoting good governance1 is one of the more important objectives
in South Africa— and Africa at large— to ensure continued economic development during the twenty-first century.2 Former United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan stressed, “[G]ood governance is perhaps the single
most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.”3 Many African countries are now defined by their nations’ transitions toward independence and, with that, their shifts toward “democratic”
systems of governance. South Africa established a new racially integrated
government in 1994 after prolonged domestic and international pressure
precipitated the collapse of the country’s Apartheid regime. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is one of the primary initiatives undertaken by
the democratically elected government of South Africa to mitigate the
nationally institutionalized race gap in jobs, education, and industry
ownership.
This Note argues that bad governance and corruption have encumbered economic and political progress in many areas, including the provision of basic public goods,4 and thus obfuscate numerous positive socioeconomic rights protected in South Africa’s post-Apartheid Constitution.5
Many African countries breed corruption based on incentives for bureaucrats to gain from political office, in kind counteracting well-intended
1. “The good governance agenda is in a large measure predicated upon using the
public law and policy framework to facilitate freedom of contract and exchange in the
private sphere. It thus involves putting in place institutions which work under a predetermined discourse of legal rights and entitlements that presumably guarantee economic
and political freedom.” James Thuo Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narrative on
Africa’s Economic and Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971, 1034 (2000).
2. “The prospect of high sustained growth in Africa raises the possibility of the
transformation of these countries from a reliance on primary agricultural production
and mineral extraction which have characterized their economics for decades.” Richard
Joseph, Is Good Governance Necessary for Economic Progress in Africa?, AFRICA PLUS (Aug.
4, 2013), http://africaplus.wordpress.com/2013/08/04/is-good-governance-necessaryfor-economic-progress-in-africa/#_edn1. “The ultimate challenge is the creation of an
impartial and universal state which treats all citizens fairly.” See id. (referring to the
work of Professor Larry Diamond).
3. Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Africa, 43 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 165, 186 (2009) (citing Frank Tenente, Feeding the World One Seed at a
Time: A Practical Alternative for Solving World Hunger, 5 Nw. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 298,
312 (2007)).
4. Joseph, supra note 2 (summarizing the claims of Larry Diamond).
5. South Africa established an Interim Constitution in 1994 before finalizing its
Constitution in 1996. The 1996 Constitution codified most of the Interim Constitution’s provisions unchanged. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993.
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redistributive policies like BEE. In such corrupt countries, “patterns of
political behavior . . . reflect as their justifying principle that the offices of
the existing state may be competed for and then utilized for the benefit of
office-holders as well as that of their reference or support group.”6 Bureaucrats’ self-interested actions consequently divert resources earmarked to
consummate citizens’ socio-economic rights. African developmentalist
states must mitigate corrupt practices by changing the incentive system
and instituting more stringent multi-institutional oversight of bureaucratic
decision-making— especially in the awarding of government contracts to
private companies. This begins with curbing improperly wielded executive
discretion in dominant party democracies where opposition parties have
yet to gain viability as an alternative to the status quo.
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of South Africa’s transition
from Apartheid towards its new democratic government and political economy, of which BEE has been a central component over the last twenty
years. It will track the development of black empowerment philosophy to
the present day and reveal overarching issues in its implementation. Furthermore, it will present a case study of corruptive practices in the mining
industry in response to BEE principles, regulations, and African National
Congress (ANC) executive misconduct. The case study investigates the
attempt by Gold Fields Limited to comply with BEE standards, providing
insight into the potential for corruption within the parameters of the mining industry, and what tactics companies utilize to circumvent stringent
compliance restrictions that apply to domestic industries beyond mining.
Part II will critique the developments of BEE legislative policies, most
importantly the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (B-BBEE
Act) and its Codes, including their progeny and amendments. In Part III,
this Note will examine recent judicial decisions in South Africa that— by
seeking to limit ministerial discretion, mitigate crippling corruptive practices within the country, and provide support to assert principles from
international treaties within domestic South African institutions— have
resulted in the liberal expansion of judiciary powers. Part IV delineates the
four major international and regional conventions to which South Africa is
a signatory to find instruments by which South Africa has agreed to limit
corruption that can be given effect through constitutional provisions and
judicial interpretations. This Note concludes by stipulating how South
Africa can improve implementation of its BEE program by limiting corruption within all three government branches.
I.

The Evolution of Black Economic Empowerment

A.

BEE’s Origins

Black empowerment has been a common theme among South African
activists throughout the twentieth century, whether framed by the ANC
6. Joseph, supra note 2.
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leadership’s goals, the ANC’s evolving tactical documents,7 or other
residual movements— for example, the ANC Youth League, the South African Students’ Organization, or Black Consciousness. Dr. Dale T. McKinley
notes:
BEE was framed by [the early ANC leadership’s desire for a specific section
of the black population to become an integral part of the capitalist system]
but was mediated by the macro-nationalist politics of the ANC which provided a sense of collective (predominately racial) and de-classed ‘ownership’
over the emerging struggle against the racialised organisation of South African society.8

BEE was a policy enacted directly to counteract the National Party’s (NP)
policy of Apartheid, the legally institutionalized segregation of non-white
groups in South Africa, and the general suppression of black advancement
by Dutch and British colonizers since the seventeenth century.
Apartheid was a complex system designed to control the labor, movement, and education of Africans within clearly defined and segregated
racial groups. From 1948 through F.W. de Klerk’s election in 1989, the NP
relegated the non-white population to vastly inferior conditions by preventing them from gaining access to jobs, education, and housing. The Bantu
Education Act of 19539 prevented non-whites from receiving more than the
basic education needed to fill unskilled labor positions under white control
or within their Bantustan homelands.10 The Group Areas Act11 and the
Natives Resettlement Act12 relegated blacks to live in homelands representing miniscule portions of the country and further institutionalized the
practice of migrant labor in mines, thus effectively ensuring that nonwhites did not participate in urban life. Such Apartheid policies propelled
the education and skill deficits rampant amongst the non-white population
in South Africa at the cusp of the new universal democracy in 1994. Intrinsic economic and income inequality between the small, dominant white
elite and the rest of the population depleted the country’s human capital,
as the government largely ignored most of its citizenry. These policies have
had an enduring effect on the socio-economic fabric of South African society to this day.
Although BEE philosophy focused initially on elevating a portion of
the black populace within the colonially imposed capitalist system, by the
climax of anti-Apartheid protests in the 1980s, the calls for social and
7. See Dale T. McKinley, The History and Character of ‘Black Economic Empowerment’, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/features/71539 (indicating that the ANC’s 1969 Strategy & Tactics document suggested
pursuit of a new black empowerment set against special colonialism in South Africa).
8. Id.
9. Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 (S. Afr.).
10. See id.; MAMPHELA RAMPHELE, ACROSS BOUNDARIES: THE JOURNEY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN WOMAN LEADER 44 (1995) (reflecting that Minister of Native Affairs H. F. Verwoerd
had felt that “‘Bantu’ children should not be shown green pastures where they would
never be allowed to graze”).
11. See Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (S. Afr.).
12. See Natives Resettlement Act 19 of 1954 (S. Afr.).
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material liberation evolved into a “de-racialised capitalism” within a greater
political liberation movement against Apartheid.13 The ANC’s embrace of
the colonial capitalist political economy, historically grounded in
Apartheid’s authoritarian socio-economic relations, required the newly
integrated government to pressure the status quo white corporate capital to
incorporate new black investors, and divert institutional and capital government resources to facilitate a new black bourgeoisie through expansion
of the BEE program.14 The newly elected ANC government invested in the
“privatization/corporatisation of state assets, awarding of government tenders, the provision of seed capital and the threat of effective expropriation . . . through the unilateral imposition of quotas of black ownership in
key sectors of the economy,”15 thus prompting the transfer of shares in
white-dominated corporations to black owners.16
While the basic contours of democracy are apparent in South Africa
from a distant glance (a constitution, democratic voting, a multiparty parliament, and bureaucratic institutions17), the country remains crippled by
corruption, crony capitalism, and both ineffective and self-interested
bureaucrats.18 Corruption and authoritarian rule have long characterized
governmental relations within South Africa,19 and the ANC has perpetu13. See McKinley, supra note 7.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Fool’s Gold, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
briefing/21576655-black-economic-empowerment-has-not-worked-well-nor-will-it-endsoon-fools-gold.
17. South Africa is now a constitutional parliamentary democracy, vesting legislative
authority in the Parliament. The National Assembly, one of two houses of the Parliament, chooses the President from amongst its members. The President appoints the
twenty-five Cabinet Ministers, assigns their powers and functions, and may dismiss them
at will. See Government in South Africa, BRAND SOUTH AFRICA, http://
www.southafrica.info/about/government/gov.htm#.VJhDCsADI (last updated Nov. 6,
2015). The ANC has held at least sixty-two percent of the votes— and consequently
National Assembly seats— in every post-Apartheid election, thus ensuring the ANC can
effectively govern the country unilaterally. See generally A Look Back at National Election
Results, BRAND SOUTH AFRICA (May 8, 2014), http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica.com/
democracy/3824-a-look-back-at-national-election-results (providing election breakdowns
since 1994).
18. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in
Africa, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1209, 1220 (2003) (“[N]otwithstanding the introduction of
multiparty rule, most sub-Saharan political systems are still characterized by old patrimonial tendencies, related to underlying political economies and cultures, which were
hardly affected by the change in ideological tune.”); Oko, supra note 3, at 195 (“Corruption in the civil service is so widespread and involves common occurrences of delayed
files, making wrong claims, favouritism, truancy, outright demand for bribes and abuse
of office, among others.”).
19. The Apartheid government was unafraid to flex its police powers to oppress
resistance movements, utilizing violence to eliminate anti-Apartheid protests. Incidents
like the Sharpesville Massacre in 1960 and the Soweto Uprising in 1976 exacerbated the
rift between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC through township violence in the
early 1990s. Numerous civil rights leaders were also detained or murdered. See Ivor
Chipkin and Barbara Lipietz, Transforming South Africa’s Racial Bureaucracy: New Public
Management and Public Sector Reform in Contemporary South Africa 12, http://
wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/seminar/Chipkin2012.pdf. See also Terrorism Act 83 of
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ated this alarming trend since obtaining power. Corruption and a dearth
of bureaucratic accountability inherently prevent the government from fulfilling its socially contractual obligations to its citizens, and betray the aims
of BEE. While it is indisputable that BEE has substantially contributed to a
small class of wealthy black leaders20— many of whom possess sway within
the government through their activities within the controlling ANC— the
benefits generally have been limited to this politically connected subgroup
of the population. Such limited BEE impact has failed to alleviate significantly the pre-1994 issues of severe income disparity,21 education deficit,
and employment gaps normalized within South Africa. It is from this
framework that the deficiencies in the BEE legislative scheme must be critically assessed.
B.

Black Economic Empowerment in Practice

With a GDP that represents thirty percent of Africa’s overall GDP and
is four times as large as its sub-Saharan neighbors, South Africa drives economic growth throughout the continent.22 Mining has traditionally been
one of South Africa’s most integral industries, dating back to the initial
Dutch colonization in the seventeenth century. To this day, South Africa
maintains some of the largest reserves of key minerals— including gold, silver, platinum, steel, iron, diamonds, and aluminum— in the world, thus
warranting the government’s concentrated investment in mining and the
backward linkages that contribute towards its industrialization.23 Despite
the arguably benevolent ambitions of many leaders in promoting BEE in a
country with such vast natural resources, the government’s implementation thus far has left much to be desired. The deficiencies result from the
ample discretion allotted to some bureaucrats, the tying of black employment incentives to the awarding of government contracts (manifesting in
ANC leverage) to those corporations that follow orders, and the entrenched
elites who exploit such malfeasance for their own benefit.
1967 (S. Afr.) (granting the Minister of Justice discretionary power to detain people
indefinitely).
20. For example, Cyril Ramaphosa, a union-boss-turned-tycoon and a top ANC
leader, is now estimated to have a net worth of $675 million. Fool’s Gold, supra note 16.
21. South Africa’s GINI coefficient— measuring the income disparity within a country on a scale of 0 to 1 (the higher the number, the more disparity)— of 0.7 is the highest
in the world as of 2013. See Robin Woolley, Transformation: A Reminder of Why We Are
Doing This and a Reflection on the Revised Codes, TRANSCEND CORP. ADVISORS (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.transcend.co.za/resource-centre/blog/robin/transformation_a_re
minder_of_why_we_doing_this_and_a_reflection_of_the_revised_b-bbee_codesFalse
html.
22. Taku Fundira, Trade at a Glance: the BRICS’ Engagement With Africa, in BRICS:
SOUTH AFRICA’S WAY AHEAD? 48, 78– 84 (Ron Sandrey et al., 2013).
23. See id. at 78 (“[H]istorically, South Africa’s trade policy was guided by three
interrelated strategies, that is, import substituting industrialisation, the development of
strategic industries (in arms, oil and coal)— due to imposed [international] sanctions—
and the development of minerals-related exports.”). South Africa’s industrial output and
mineral production represent forty and forty-five percent, respectively, of Africa’s total
output. Id.
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BEE deals now effectively necessitate political connections more than
business skills, perpetuating a government-led de facto system of patronage
rather than an equal opportunity meritocracy.24 The emphasis on black
ownership in State-owned enterprises’ selection of suppliers, authorizations, and awarding of licenses in regulated sectors (particularly mining)
penalizes those firms without sufficient ownership shares and jobs in
black hands.25 Even those firms that have “genuine compliance” do so by
using black management employees as ‘insurance policies,’ which allow
companies to be recognized as compliant for the sake of the policy rules
rather than meeting the goals and ultimately the purpose of [Broad-Based
Black Economic Empowerment] to spread out economic control and allow
empowered employees to be genuinely involved in business operations.26

This reveals a fundamental flaw in the conception of black management
and ownership quotas within the empowerment principles in South Africa:
the National Party’s egregious suppression of educational opportunities for
non-white citizens throughout the Apartheid era has created a paucity of
qualified workers from previously disempowered groups due to both an
education deficit and a lack of investment in training that would enable
such workers to compete within an increasingly complex global
economy.27
BEE also faces the issue of fronting, or corporations’ deliberate circumvention of the B-BBEE Act and the Codes of Good Practice, usually based
on misrepresentations of facts related to the black ownership and management requirements that dictate BEE compliance.28 Corporations most
commonly “front” by means of window-dressing,29 benefit diversion,30
24. See Fool’s Gold, supra note 16.
25. “A contract between the state and a private business would in all likelihood be
awarded to a [higher BEE] contributor.” Henk Kloppers & Willemien du Plessis, Corporate Social Responsibility, Legislative Reforms and Mining in South Africa, 26 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RES. L. 91, 99– 100 (2008).
26. Elizabeth A. Hoffman, Note, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Discrimination Against the
Majority Undermines Equality, While Continuing to Benefit Few Under the Guise of Economic Empowerment, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 87, 97– 98 (2008). See Fool’s Gold,
supra note 16 (noting that Adcorp, a large employment agency, has observed that private
companies now pay educated black workers twenty-three percent higher wages than
equally qualified white workers in an effort to meet BBE regulations perpetuated by BBBEE and the Codes).
27. See Gregory J. Millman, Black Economic Empowerment Seen Hiking S. Africa Risk,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/04/15/
black-economic-empowerment-seen-hiking-south-africa-risk/. See also COLIN MCCARTHY,
UNIDO, PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SOUTH AFRICA 43– 44
(2005), http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/Productiv
ity_performance_in_DCs_South_Africa.pdf (arguing that South Africa’s development
route would not create jobs for the majority of working poor and unemployed citizens
because of the country’s focus on industries requiring higher-level skills in the context
of education deficit).
28. Fronting, THE DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., http://www.thedti.gov.za/economic
_empowerment/fronting.jsp (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).
29. Window-dressing is where black people are appointed to an enterprise for tokenism, and are either discouraged or prevented from participating in the business operations of the corporation. Id.
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and opportunistic intermediaries31— all of which are utilized by executives
to retain control of the corporation’s operations while the company still
reaps the benefits of government contracts. Although the B-BBEE Amendment and the Revised Codes seek to address fronting by imposing penalties
for such duplicitous activities,32 there are circumstances where a corporation’s use of fronting “is almost impossible to monitor.”33 South African
corporations will likely continue to find creative schemes to evade the government’s tougher BEE standards.
When the Fraser Institute compiled its ranking of countries for policy
potential in mining jurisdictions, it noted that South Africa’s ranking of
fifty-fourth was partially derived from one exploration company technical
director’s claim that “[i]n South Africa, the entire process of the administration of, and applying for, and awarding of, exploration rights is protracted,
corrupt, arbitrary, inconsistent, and a nightmare.”34 While BEE has a historic foundation within ANC ideology, the ANC-led implementation has yet
to yield the results necessary to uplift the non-white population after centuries of colonial suppression, and thus requires both alterations to its execution and more stringent oversight of its implementation.
C.

The Gold Fields Case Study: (Selective) Black Economic
Empowerment

Gold Fields Limited is one of the largest corporate investors in South
Africa,35 illustrating the continued centrality of the mining industry to
South Africa’s economic objectives. Furthermore, mining still accounts for
nearly sixty percent of South Africa’s export revenue and the employment
of about half a million people directly— which does not even include those
employed in related industries and backwards linkages.36 The Gold Fields
controversy epitomizes the turmoil that South Africa-based companies’
boards of directors experience in simultaneously attempting to attract
black equity ownership in accordance with government legislation and reg30. Benefit diversion is where the corporation’s economic benefits from B-BBEE
compliance do not “flow to black people in the ratio as specified in the relevant legal
documentation.” Id.
31. An opportunistic intermediary is a corporation that leverages another enterprise’s favorable B-BBEE status through contractual agreements. The circumstances of
the transaction generally include restrictions concerning the identity of the opportunistic intermediary’s proprietary information (suppliers and clients), contractual terms
that are not considered fair and reasonable, and other indicators of fronting activity. See
id.
32. See discussion infra Part II.B– C.
33. Tashmir Singh, South Africa: Will the Proposed Revision to the B-BBEE Codes of
Good Practice Lead to Increased Fronting Activity?, MONDAQ (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.
mondaq.com/x/276074/Corporate+Commercial+Law/Will+The+Proposed+Revision+To
+The+BBBEE+Codes+Of+Good+Practice.
34. See Peter Leon, Marikana, Mangaung and the Future of the South African Mining
Industry, 31 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 171, 177 (2013).
35. Other large corporate investors include MTN, Vodacom, Eskom, Sasol, SABMiller, Shoprite, Protea, Multichoice, Standard Bank, ABSA, and FNB. See Fundira, supra
note 22, at 80.
36. Leon, supra note 34, at 178.
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ulations, while satisfying self-interested ANC politicians who control the
discretionary decision-making process by which the government allots its
contractual work to companies desperately in need of the business to maintain viability. In 2010, Gold Fields made a BEE deal to issue 600,000
shares and sell nine percent of its South Deep subsidiary mine— worth an
estimated R2.1 billion (Gold Fields’ largest asset)— to a black-ownership
consortium.37 Gold Fields sold this stake to comply with the BEE-based
Mining Charter requirement that South African mining companies sell or
cede at least twenty-six percent of their operations to “Historically Disadvantaged South Africans,”38 yet executive oversight over the BEE deal led to
considerable controversy.
Companies often sell ownership stakes at a discount and finance them
with company loans to accommodate non-white ownership requirements.
This process leverages the company in debt to attract black shareholders to
qualify the company for government contracts with its improved BEE
score.39 While Gold Fields had initially opted for an employee share
scheme— in which the company would provide an equity stake to black
employees, serve as a trustee in running the company, and subsequently
distribute profits— civil rights leader and former board chairwoman Dr.
Mamphela Ramphele insisted, “The [South Africa] government . . . shoved
the list of some of Invictus Gold’s black economic empowerment shareholders down Gold Fields’ throat, with an ultimatum that if the preferred
names were not taken on board it would be denied a mining license.”40
CEO Nicholas Holland affirmed Dr. Ramphele’s claims, listing individuals
in the Department of Mineral Resources (including former deputy directorgeneral Jacinto Rocha) as those who had unfairly pressured him into
37. See Kevin Crowley, Gold Fields Legal Chief Quits Amid SEC Probe Into Sale of
Stake, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0120/gold-fields-legal-chief-quits-amid-sec-probe-into-sale-of-stake.html; Sikonathi Mantshantsha, Was Gold Fields Negligent in BEE Deal?, FIN. MAIL (Sept. 26, 2013), http://
www.financialmail.co.za/moneyinvesting/2013/09/26/was-gold-fields-negligent-in-beedeal.
38. Amendment of the Broad-Based Socio-economic Empowerment Charter for the
South African Mining and Minerals Industry, GN 838 of GG 33573 (20 Sept. 2010),
http://www.dmr.gov.za/publications/summary/108-mining-charter-downloads/128amendedofbbseecharter.html [hereinafter Mining Charter Amendment].
39. See Fool’s Gold, supra note 16. Such practices were necessary where a company
relied upon government contracts to maintain economic viability, and there were limited
black entrepreneurs who could accumulate enough capital to make such investments.
See id. The lack of black entrepreneurial capital is directly tied to the past Apartheid
practices of limiting black educational opportunities that has created both human and
monetary capital deficits within the black community. These issues are pronounced
where there are required black ownership quotas in mining companies (and in other
industries) that are difficult to satisfy without soliciting ANC politicians, who through
self-interested transactions, funnel capital within the party— exemplifying the ironic
results of BEE policy in perpetuating a new black elite.
40. Setumo Stone, State gave Gold Fields no choice on BEE, says Ramphele, BUS. DAY
(Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2013/03/12/state-gavegold-fields-no-choice-on-bee-says-ramphele. See Mantshantsha, supra note 37 (reporting
that members of the BEE consortium were awarded free shares and an upfront “dividend” worth about R73m despite having never contributed financially to the company).
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accepting the BEE consortium terms.41 Following these government
threats, Gold Fields capitulated to the ANC’s demands to ensure it would
be awarded its necessary mining licenses.
Gold Fields went so far as to hire the U.S.-based law firm Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP to conduct an internal investigation of
the company’s actions, which the South African media has accused the
company of initially ignoring and thereafter burying.42 While Gold Fields
has been under investigation from the South African government, the U.S.
Department of Justice, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for alleged corruption charges, it has been uncovered that
[a]mong those involved in the Invictus Gold deal are former deputy president Baleka Mbete, also [ANC] chairwoman;43 Limpho Hani, wife of late
South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani; Jerome Brauns SC, who
represented President Jacob Zuma during his rape trial; former Springbok
Ashwin Willemse, and Mandla Msimang, son of [ANC] party stalwarts
Mendi Msimang and the late Manto Tshabalala-Msimang.44

Also involved were two Ministers of Parliament who worked on the minerals oversight committee tasked with “monitoring” the Department of Mineral Resources, which granted the necessary mining license to Gold Fields
a month later in August 2010.45 The Gold Fields case personifies the
endemic corruption— encouraged and systematized by ministerial discretion and government procurement— that places South African companies’
executives in the precarious position of choosing either to comply with the
ANC’s condemned tactics or potentially mortgage their companies’ financial futures.

41. Mantshantsha, supra note 37. Jacinto Rocha, however, has denied such accusations of wrongdoing within the Department of Mineral Resources. Lindo Xulu & Jana
Marais, BEE deal “not forced” on Gold Fields, BUS. DAY (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.bd
live.co.za/business/mining/2013/09/22/bee-deal-not-forced-on-gold-fields (“Apart from
informing Gold Fields that the ‘once empowered, always empowered’ principle didn’t
exist and that they needed to do another [BEE] deal, we never dictated to them on the
nature of the deal and who to include.”).
42. Christopher M. Matthews, SEC Investigates Gold Fields for South African Deal,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/09/12/secinvestigates-miner-gold-fields-for-south-african-deal/.
43. Baleka Mbete holds a stake worth R25m in the Invictus Gold consortium that
acquired ownership in Gold Fields. See Mantshantsha, supra note 37.
44. Stone, supra note 40.
45. Sikonathi Mantshantsha, Defending Gold Field’s BEE Deal, FIN. MAIL (May 15,
2014), http://www.financialmail.co.za/coverstory/2014/05/15/defending-gold-field-sbee-deal. State officials’ abuse of power personifies “tenderpreneurship,” in which connected businessmen and officials abuse their authority to secure government contracts
and obtain economic advantages. See Nicolas Cook, South Africa: Politics, Economy, and
U.S. Relations, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 10 (Dec. 19, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R43130.pdf.
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II. Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment: Winning the Battle
But Not the War
A.

The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 (BBBEE Act)

Criticisms of the black economic empowerment initiatives from 1994
through the early 2000s46 came from both the new black elite and majority
populations following the Johannesburg Stock Exchange collapse.47 In
response to such BEE failures, President Thabo Mbeki enacted the BEE
Commission, which laid the foundation for the revamped B-BBEE Act in
2003.48 While viewed by citizens as a progressive step towards ingraining
BEE within South African economic policy, the legislation’s holes hindered
achievement of its lofty ambitions.
The B-BBEE Act established the Advisory Council tasked with counseling the government on BEE, reviewing the progress of BEE initiatives, advising on draft codes and strategy development, and “facilitat[ing]
partnerships between organs of state and the private sector that will
advance the objectives of [BEE].”49 The Council is composed of the President, the Minister of Trade and Industry (MTI), Cabinet Ministers, and ten
to fifteen members appointed by the President.50 While the President
“shall have regard” for maintaining appropriate expertise and representing
“relevant constituencies,”51 the only discernible limitation on the President’s selection of Council members is that he “shall follow an appropriate
consultative process.”52 The President’s wide discretion to select Council
members tasked with facilitating partnerships between the government
and the private sector provides ample room for corruption. The Council
even regulates itself by resolution, thus reinforcing the ANC’s control over
46. BEE initiatives in South Africa included the South African Constitution of 1996,
the Employment Equity Act of 1998, the Skills Development Act of 1998, the Skills
Development Levy Act of 1999, the Preferential Procurement Act of 2000, the Public
Finance Management Act of 1999, and the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003.
47. The black bourgeoisie felt that the government, in promoting its neoliberal
macroeconomic policy, was focused on facilitating the interests of the local white and
international corporate capital rather than sustaining a black capitalist presence within
these corporations. The black proletariat viewed the ANC’s neoliberal policies (BEE) as
responsible for high unemployment, increasing societal inequality, inefficient resource
allocation, and “a betrayal of the redistributive principles and vision of socioeconomic
equality of the liberation struggle.” See McKinley, supra note 7. See also Irene-marié
Esser & Adriette Dekker, The Dynamics of Corporate Governance in South Africa: Broad
Based Black Economic Empowerment and the Enhancement of Good Corporate Governance
Principles, 3 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 157, 161 (2008) (observing that, as of 2005, white
South Africans still controlled more than two-thirds of the companies listed on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange despite comprising only ten percent of the population,
compared to black South Africans controlling merely four percent of companies).
48. Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (S. Afr.).
49. Id. §§ 4, 5.
50. Id. § 6(1).
51. Id. § 6(2).
52. See id. § 6(3).
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implementation of the entire BEE process.53
The B-BBEE Act allots significant discretion to the MTI to project his
own standards and interpretations of BEE upon South Africa. The MTI
may issue, with little public accountability and without Advisory Council
deliberation,54 “codes of good practice” that further interpretation of various B-BBEE definitions or entities, qualification criteria for preferential
purposes, indicators of measurement for B-BBEE, weighting of indicators,
guidelines for stakeholders in “relevant” sectors of the economy, and “any
other matter necessary to achieve the objectives of [B-BBEE].”55 The MTI
also issues a strategy for B-BBEE (primarily dealing with its coordination,
financing, and reporting standards) and may change or replace a strategy
unilaterally.56 The B-BBEE Act empowers the MTI with wide latitude to
impose his will, and thus effectuate the ANC’s will, upon the BEE program
without necessary checks and balances.
The effects of the B-BBEE Act crystallized from 2004 to 2008 when it
became “the dominant feature on the mergers and acquisitions landscape
in South Africa.”57 ANC leadership, however, utilized the legislation’s wide
ministerial discretion to its own ends, thus preventing BEE from either significantly mitigating the severity of income disparity or elevating a large
swath of the non-white population. South African civil rights activist Archbishop Desmond Tutu critically pondered, “What is black empowerment
when it seems to benefit not the vast majority [of the black population] but
an elite that tends to be recycled?”58 Moeletsi Mbeki, political economist
and younger brother of former President Thabo Mbeki, decried BEE as
53. See id. § 7(3). Council resolutions must come after “consultation” with the MTI,
another member of the controlling political party (ANC). See id.
54. See id. § 9(5) (requiring only that the MTI issue the Codes by publishing them in
the Gazette for public comment for a period of sixty days without necessitating the
implementation of such feedback into Codes revisions).
55. See id. § 9(1) (emphasis added).
56. See id. § 11(1) (“A strategy . . . must provide for an integrated, co-ordinated and
uniform approach to broad-based black economic empowerment by all organs of state,
public entities, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, local communities,
and other stakeholders.”). The MTI also may implement regulations “with regard to any
matter that it is necessary to prescribe in order to ensure the proper implementation of
[B-BBEE].” Id. § 14.
57. Esser & Dekker, supra note 47, at 167. The authors state:
The potential effectiveness of [compliance with the general scorecard] can be
seen from the several important B[-]BBEE transactions in 2005. For example
Tiger Brands (a food conglomerate) struck a deal in terms of which 4% of its
shares (worth R729m) will be transferred within the next 10 years to its staff
who are 80% black. Edcon (a retail conglomerate) set aside R455m for a staff
empowerment scheme. Mvela Group acquired 25% of the health care group
Afrox. Old Mutual, Nedcor and Mutual & Federal increased black shareholding
by 12,75% in a R7,2bn deal for the benefit of black controlled entities owned by
black clients. ABSA sold 10% to a consortium led by Mvelaphanda Holdings.
Standard Bank and the Liberty Group sold 10% worth R5,6bn to Tutuwa Consortium.
Id.
58. Tutu Warns of Poverty “Powder Keg”, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2004), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4035809.stm.
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“legalised corruption.”59 Such criticisms placed pressure on the government to revise B-BBEE by passing the recent Amendment.
B.

The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Act of
2013

In response to the public’s denigration of B-BBEE’s shortcomings,
South Africa passed the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
Amendment Act (B-BBEE Amendment).60 The B-BBEE Amendment has
now established a Commission to play an oversight and advocacy role
regarding BEE policy, including the investigation of complaints concerning
B-BBEE transactions (for example, fronting practices and abuse) through
subpoena powers and court applications to restrain alleged breaches of BBBEE Acts.61 The Commissioner, who heads the Commission and must
have “suitable qualifications and experience,” is mandated to ensure that
the Commission is “impartial and perform[s] its functions without fear,
favour or prejudice.”62 Notwithstanding the B-BBEE Amendment’s attempt
to bolster the Commissioner’s independence to oversee BEE practices and
limit ministerial discretion, the Commissioner is still appointed by the
MTI63— and can also be removed by the MTI— thus making it susceptible to
ANC influence and intrinsically blunting the Commission’s impact in the
context of historical executive abuse.
Not only may the government now ban companies from engaging in
future government contracts for contravening BEE policies, but the B-BBEE
Amendment provides the government and public entities with a statutory
right to cancel any contract or authorization awarded to companies that
falsify information on their B-BBEE status.64 The B-BBEE Amendment also
introduced various criminal offenses for illegal practices designed to circumvent B-BBEE requirements. Such offenses may result in substantial
firm-wide and individual fines, including up to ten years of imprisonment.65 Although the B-BBEE Amendment reflects a meaningful legislative
59. Magnus Taylor, Moeletsi Mbeki on South Africa: ‘Black Economic Empowerment is
Legalised Corruption’, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://africanarguments.
org/2012/09/13/moeletsi-mbeki-on-south-africa-%E2%80%9Cblack-economic-empow
erment-is-legalised-corruption-%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%93-by-magnus-taylor/. See also
McKinley, supra note 7 (“[C]ontemporary BEE in South Africa has become, more than
ever, the prime practical vehicle for elite accumulation, rent seeking and corruption as
well as the conceptual cover for extreme inequality.”).
60. Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Act 46 of 2013 (S. Afr.)
[hereinafter B-BBEE Amendment Act].
61. Id. § 13B.
62. Id. § 13C.
63. See id.
64. Id. § 13A.
65. See id. § 13O (stating that the government can also fine firms up to ten percent
of total revenue for a year and can ban firms from contracting with government and
public entities for up to ten years). Werksmans Attorneys view the affirmative obligations imposed on the South African government to take the Codes into account in procurement policies and issuing licenses as a significant change from the workings of the
B-BBEE. See Werksmans Attorneys, Amendments to the BBBEE Act and the Codes
Explained, LEX AFRICA, http://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/04
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effort to limit ministerial and corporate discretion regarding BEE principles, there are ways to improve oversight capabilities further and shield BEE
implementation from political abuse— most significantly by providing
either minority political parties or independent commissions with audit
and oversight capabilities.
C.

Codes of Good Practice on Black Economic Empowerment

B-BBEE requires that “every organ of state and public entity” reasonably apply relevant codes of good practice issued by the MTI through the
Gazette when developing criteria for issuing licenses, concessions, preferential procurement policies, sales of state-owned enterprises, and entering
into partnerships with the private sector.66 Former Minister Mandisi
Mpahlwa wielded such appropriated power by publishing the inaugural
Codes of Good Practice on Black Economic Empowerment67 (the Codes)
on February 9, 2007. Most notably, the Codes grade a company with
scorecard rankings “that not only affect[ ] their own ability to win government contracts but can also affect the competitiveness of their supply chain
partners, because the ranking of a company’s suppliers affects a company’s
own ranking.”68 On October 11, 2013, Minister Rob Davies issued a new
Codes of Good Practice69 (the Revised Codes) to amend the Codes in effect
since 2007. While Minister Davies initially intended to implement the new
code by October 11, 2014, he extended the transitional period another six
months to run through April 30, 2015.70
The Revised Codes “introduc[e] a number of welcome compromises
and concessions, particularly for smaller companies.”71 The turnover
threshold for Qualifying Small Enterprises (QSEs) was raised from between
R5m and R35m to between R10m and R50m.72 Exempt Microenterprises
(EMEs), now consisting of businesses earning less than R10m in total revenue, automatically acquire status as a “Level Four Contributor” with a B0002-WERKSMANS-bbbee-booklet.pdf, at 6 (“Government policy has to date been based
on the ‘voluntarist’ principle that the manner in which a firm applies BBBEE is to be
decided by the individual firm. . . . [T]he [B-BBEE Amendment] framework introduces
penalties in certain circumstances. This is an important departure from previous Government policy.”).
66. B-BBEE Amendment Act, supra note 60, §§ 10(a)– (d).
67. Codes of Good Practice, GN 112 of GG 29617 (9 Feb. 2007).
68. Millman, supra note 27.
69. Codes of Good Practice, GN 1019 of GG 36928 (11 Oct. 2013) [hereinafter
Codes of Good Practice 2013], https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/
docs/code_gud_practice10102013.pdf.
70. Amended Codes of Good Practice, GN 226 of GG 37453 (18 Mar. 2014), https:/
/www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/docs/codes/Gov_gaz_37453.pdf.
71. Nigel Payne, New BBBEE Codes Well Received, HR FUTURE, http://www.hr
future.net/bee/new-bbbee-codes-well-received.php?Itemid=77 (last visited Nov. 29,
2015). Cf. Robyn Armstrong & Rita Spalding, Revised DTI Codes Pave the Way for New
Phase of B-BBEE, ACC (July 5, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=294f6a11-4c9f-4c12-8e05-3e985f0732cc (concluding that the Revised Codes
“appear[ ] to be the start of a new, more stringent era of black economic
empowerment”).
72. Codes of Good Practice 2013, supra note 69, § 5.1.
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BBEE recognition level of one hundred percent,73 thus allowing entrepreneurs to focus on developing profitable companies that provide employment opportunities without concerning themselves with potentially
inefficient and expensive regulation compliance during the nascent phase
of their enterprises. Furthermore, annual verification of B-BBEE performance against the scorecards no longer needs to be assessed by verified
agents, thus mitigating compliance costs for QSEs and EMEs by enabling
such enterprises to obtain sworn affidavits on an annual basis confirming
their annual total revenue (R50m or less) and their level of black
ownership.74
The Revised Codes modified the generic scorecard by consolidating
the Codes’ original seven elements into only five elements: (1) ownership;
(2) management control (which now includes the previous employment
equity element); (3) skills development; (4) enterprise and supplier development (a consolidation of the previous preferential procurement and
enterprise development scorecards); and (5) socio-economic development.75 Priority is placed on ownership, skills development, and enterprise and supplier development, where failure to attain forty percent subminimum targets will automatically downgrade Large Enterprises (LEs)
and QSEs one level in B-BBEE rating.76 LEs that choose to focus on other
B-BBEE requirements, besides the now-compulsory black shareholding
requirements, will be “seriously and adversely impacted” because of the
automatic two-level downgrade for failure to attain the ten percent minimum black ownership target.77
The QSE scorecard has been discarded, and QSEs are now measured
in terms of all five elements. QSEs are only required to comply with the
minimum threshold requirements for the compulsory “ownership” element
and either of the other two priority elements— “skills development” or
“enterprise and supplier development”— in order to avoid the penalty of
being downgraded one level.78 LEs must comply with all three priority
elements— as opposed to QSEs’ need to attain merely two— thus demon73. Id. §§ 4.1, 4.2. About ninety-five percent of companies fall into the EME category. Singh, supra note 33. The Revised Codes scorecard is included in Figure 1 in the
Appendix.
74. See Codes of Good Practice 2013, supra note 69, §§ 4.5, 5.3.3. This also creates
a potential oversight problem of smaller companies, which now can more easily dupe
the government about fulfillment of scorecard measures— thus providing room to exacerbate corruptive practices. These are also the companies most motivated to cheat statistics given their reliance on threshold B-BBEE categorizations for a competitive advantage.
See Payne, supra note 71.
75. See Codes of Good Practice 2013, supra note 69, § 8.1; Webber Wentzel, Draft
Revised BBBEE Codes (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.webberwentzel.com/wwb/content/en/
ww/ww-opinion-and-perspective?oid=37439&sn=Detail-2011&pid=32709. The Scorecard’s weighting of the categories is presented in Figure 2 of Appendix.
76. See Codes of Good Practice 2013, supra note 69, § 3.3.3.
77. See Wentzel, supra note 75. The newly amended South African Mining Charter
has increased the target ownership levels for mining companies’ BEE compliance to
twenty-six percent by 2014. Mining Charter Amendment, supra note 38.
78. See Wentzel, supra note 75; Codes of Good Practice 2013, supra note 69,
§ 3.3.2.2.
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strating the government’s more stringent practices for established companies with high revenues.79
Overall, the Revised Codes have simultaneously given EMEs further
leniency to avoid overregulation with extra time to incubate their enterprises, while placing higher expectations on LEs to implement BEE objectives. Verushca Pillay, Director of the Corporate and Commercial Practice
at Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, concluded, “It will generally be more difficult for
enterprises to achieve and possibly retain their current (and possibly,
favourable) B-BBEE contributor status ratings under the [R]evised Codes as
a result [of] the priority elements and the increase in weightings attached
to the BEE compliance levels.”80 Critics remain skeptical of the Revised
Codes and the government’s attempt to push for greater compliance with
BEE objectives by noting, “the change will be futile unless it is followed by
an equally significant change in sector-specific transformation charters.”81
Such charters have thus far remained unchanged.
D.

Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) and
Amendment Bill

The MPRDA complements the BEE scheme in governing South Africa’s
development of its ample natural resources. The MPRDA was designed to
force gas and oil mining companies to “compile a social or economic strategy plan to address . . . the results of past or present discrimination, transformation of the mining industry, skills development and the socioeconomic development of communities that host the mine or supply labour
to the mine.”82 The government followed up by enacting the MPRDA
Amendment Bill (MPRDA Amendment) in 2012 to curtail the MPRDA’s
“vague and ambiguous provisions,”83 which fed into the exploitation of
BEE and socio-economic objectives.
The MPRDA Amendment is a source of controversy, highlighted by the
bill’s passage in the South African Parliament without President Zuma’s
stamp of approval. The MPRDA Amendment elucidates the view that the
79. Codes of Good Practice 2013, supra note 69, § 3.3.2.1.
80. BEE Revised Codes of Good Practice Transitional Period Extended to End April
2015, CLIFFE DEKKER HOFMEYR (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/
en/news/press-releases/2014/BEE/bee-revised-codes-of-good-practice-transitional-peri
od-extended-to-end-april-2015.html. A comparison of the point systems used in the
Revised Codes and the Codes reflects the more stringent level of BEE-compliance in the
Revised Codes in Figure 1 of the Appendix.
81. See Armstrong & Spalding, supra note 71.
82. Kloppers & du Plessis, supra note 25, at 93– 94. The Act is intended for “the
promotion of economic growth and advancement of the social and economic welfare of
all South Africans through mineral and petroleum resource development.” Id. See also
Peter Leon, Creeping Expropriation of Mining Investments: An African Perspective, 27 J.
ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 597, 613– 14 (2009) (“The Act gives effect to section 25(4)(a) of
the South African Constitution, which . . . requires that reform measures be implemented to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources.”).
83. See Leon, supra note 34, at 190.
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minerals of the country “still belong[ ] to government and the citizens,”84
by providing the government with a twenty percent “free-carry interest” in
all new exploration and production rights for the oil and gas industry.85
Furthermore, Parliament amended Section 11 of the MPRDA to require
prior written approval from the Mineral Resources Minister (MRM) for the
cession or sale of any interest in mining and prospecting rights, by deleting
the exemption for mining companies listed on stock exchanges.86 The concurrent expansions of state custodianship over petroleum resources and
increased ministerial discretion “have conferred extensive new public law
powers of control on the [MRM].”87
While former MRM Susan Shabangu dismissed concerns that ministerial discretion would be arbitrary, she conceded that “[the MPRDA Amendment] will make sure the [MRM] continues to exercise, in a discreet way, his
or her right in making South Africa a thriving environment.”88 The
MPRDA Amendment— if it goes into effect— represents a governmental
power-grab to profit off of the country’s natural resources to the detriment
of both rural community rights and public discourse.89 This inherently
places more power in the hands of the MRM, and thus provides leeway for

84. Leandi Kolver, DMR renews focus on Mining Charter compliance, MINING WEEKLY
(July 3, 2014), http://www.miningweekly.com/article/dmr-to-focus-on-mining-chartercompliance-improving-miners-lives-2014-07-03 (describing Minister Ngoako
Ramatlhodi’s intent to give more effect to the Mining Charter in corporate governance of
the mining industry).
85. See Zandile Mavuso, MPRDA Concerns Linger as Industry Awaits President’s Verdict, ENGINEERING NEWS (May 23, 2014), http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-ver
sion/concerns-about-mprda-amendment-bill-linger-as-industry-awaits-presidents-verdict2014-05-23-1; Natasha Odendaal, Ramatlhodi raises MPRDA Amendment Bill concerns,
MINING WEEKLY (June 19, 2014), http://www.miningweekly.com/article/ramatlhodiraises-mprda-amendment-bill-concerns-2014-06-19 (“The Bill . . . included an ‘uncapped’ further participation clause enabling the State to acquire up to a further 80% at an
agreed price or under a production sharing agreement.”).
86. Otsile Matlou, mining director for the law firm Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs,
concluded, “Should the amendment become law, shares of listed [petroleum mining]
companies will effectively cease to be tradable.” See MPRDA detrimental to SA’s mining
industry, MINING WEEKLY (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.miningweekly.com/article/mprdadetrimental-to-sas-mining-industry-2013-03-08; Leon, supra note 82, at 624.
87. See Leon, supra note 82, at 627.
88. Allan Seccombe, Ministerial discretion will not be arbitrary, says Shabangu, BUS.
DAY (Feb. 11, 2013) (emphasis added), http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/
2013/02/11/ministerial-discretion-will-not-be-arbitrary-says-shabangu.
89. See Leon, supra note 34, at 196 (“The [Amendment] Bill is replete with instances
of vague and uncertain language and amplifies, rather than eliminates, the uncertainty
created by the MPRDA.”). See also Mavuso, supra note 85 (reporting that the Land
Access Movement of South Africa coordinator felt that there was collusion between the
government and the private sector on issues related to mineral wealth and natural
resources in rural areas). Hogan Lovells attorney Warren Beech believes the MPRDA
Amendment being placed on hold by MRM Ngoako Ramatlhodi is a “positive move” for
the mining industry. See Delays in MPRDA Amendment approval is positive for South African Mining Industry, LEXICOLOGY (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=5e3054ff-4c86-48a0-9b64-2d91b4e066a3.
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potential corruptive practices paralleling the executive abuses observed in
the government’s enforcement of South Africa’s other BEE-related laws.90
III. Trickle-Down Corruption: Under-Enforcement and Executive
Abuse
A.

African National Congress Corruption

South Africa has signed domestic legislation91 and international treaties through which it is capable of enforcing anti-corruption measures and
mitigating the endemic corruption present in both the private and public
sectors.92 Corruption extends from enforcement agencies (like the police)
to the most powerful figures within the executive branch, thereby limiting
rectification, as “robust institutional responses appear to be hamstrung by
intra- and inter-institutional manoeuvring which deflects as well as subverts the integrity of efforts to control and regulate anti-corruption enforcement.”93 The South African President— who has been a member of the
ANC since the introduction of universal democratic elections in 1994—
may wield indirect control over enforcement mechanisms through his political appointees (such as department ministers), who are given tremendous
discretion in their own right to implement the President’s agenda.94 While
beloved civil rights activist and former President Nelson Mandela ethically
guided the ANC’s authority to bring about incremental development, his
recent death symbolizes the dawn of a new era in which the ANC’s power
must be monitored closely and checked.
President Jacob Zuma— himself the subject of 783 counts of corruption that were dropped95— has overseen a tumultuous regime that has faced
numerous corruption charges encompassing the abuse of public funds,
90. Public concern over ministerial discretion is amplified considering the newly
appointed MRM, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, has an occupational history that includes allegations that he received bribes from a social grants contractor. He also went on record
criticizing South Africa’s Constitution in 2011. See Chantelle Kotze, New Minister has
his work cut out for him as raft of issues require his attention, MINING WEEKLY (July 4,
2014), http://www.miningweekly.com/article/new-minister-has-his-work-cut-out-forhim-as-raft-of-issues-require-his-attention-2014-07-04-1.
91. See generally Vinothan Naidoo, The Politics of Anti-Corruption Enforcement in
South Africa 4– 5 (prepared for the XXII IPSA World Congress of Political Science, July
2012), http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_10573.pdf (listing South African statutes and regulations passed by Parliament to combat corruption).
92. There are also numerous agencies that share anti-corruption responsibilities. See
id. at Table 1 (charting the ten agencies that shared responsibility in 2001).
93. Id. at 1. See Cook, supra note 45, at 8 (“Public corruption levels are high, partly
due to weak, abuse-prone financial and procurement systems; lack of capacity to monitor for and sanction abuses; and unequal wealth distribution.”).
94. Senior officials then foster a culture of fear that prevents junior officials from
blowing the whistle on corrupt acts. See Naidoo, supra note 91, at 8 (citing a 2003
Public Service Commission report that details senior officials’ abuse of authority by
harassing and dismissing employees who report unfair labor practices).
95. See Jeremy Kutner, In South Africa, corrupt prosecutors an ever-larger problem,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2014/
0102/In-South-Africa-corrupt-prosecutors-an-ever-larger-problem. Zuma’s corruption
allegations
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from improvement of his rural Nkandla residence96 to improper awarding
of government contracts.97 In early 2013, the Congressional Research Service reported, “Zuma stated that if a businessman joins the ANC, ‘your
business will multiply. Everything you touch will multiply.’”98 A 2011
survey by Transparency International recorded that sixty-eight percent of
urban South Africans thought the police were “extremely corrupt,”99 while
Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, South Africa’s former police chief, “admitted that he
had been instructed many times . . . by ‘powers beyond us’ not to pursue
certain cases.”100 Amid the executive branch’s disinterest in curtailing its
corruption within the context of South Africa’s parliamentary democracy,
the judiciary branch has assumed greater responsibility.
B.

The Judiciary Strikes Back

Given the corruption that consumes the South African government,
courts recently have taken important steps to limit the President’s previously unchecked executive discretion to control, both directly and indirectly, the means of law enforcement. One such instance concerned
President Zuma’s reinstatement of Richard Mdluli as the head of the crime
intelligence section of the South African Police Commission (SAPS) following the prosecutor’s dropping of charges against Mdluli that included murder, attempted murder, intimidation, kidnapping, money laundering,
fraud, theft, and corruption.101 Judge John Murphy of the North Gauteng
stemmed from a prosecution that led to the conviction of Zuma’s financial advisor for financial crimes, including charges related to a 1999, circa $4.9 billion
government arms deal with several large European firms. . . . [A]fter extensive
legal proceedings the charges were dropped in 2009, in part due to alleged interference by [President] Mbeki in the case in a manner prejudicial to Zuma.
Cook, supra note 45, at 5.
96. See generally David Smith, Jacob Zuma accused of corruption “on a grand scale” in
South Africa, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
nov/29/jacob-zuma-accused-corruption-south-africa (alleging that President Zuma misappropriated millions of government dollars worth of upgrades for his Nklanda residence in KwaZulu-Natal under the guise of security infrastructure).
97. President Zuma’s regime embodies the ANC’s inherited “institutional legacy of
corruption” from the National Party’s Apartheid regime “based on conditions of secrecy,
oppression and authoritarian rule.” See Naidoo, supra note 91, at 3. The ANC has a
history of abusing discretion since coming to power, seen in particular in the “Arms
Deal” controversy concerning the South African government’s strategic procurement
programme. A Joint Investigation Report, authored by the Auditor-General, the National
Prosecuting Authority, and the Public Protector, observed interference and non-cooperation from executive institutions “which was most notably enabled by an orchestrated
attempt within the governing ANC to forestall the momentum of the investigation, which
effectively reduced the depth of the probe and force of its findings and with it the independent investigatory standing of the agencies concerned.” Id. at 12.
98. Cook, supra note 45, at 10.
99. Something very rotten, THE ECONOMIST (June 23, 2012), http://www.economist.
com/node/21557385.
100. Kutner, supra note 95. Just over a month after Mkhwanazi declared his intent to
clean up the police ranks, he was removed from his post. See Something very rotten,
supra note 99.
101. See Kutner, supra note 95; Something very rotten, supra note 99 (arguing that
“Mdluli, then still head of the police crime intelligence unit, had given a secret report to
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High Court in Pretoria, who deemed the prosecutor’s withdrawing of the
charges against Mdluli “illegal, irrational, based on irrelevant considerations and material errors of law, and ultimately so unreasonable that no
reasonable prosecutor could have taken it,”102 ordered the police to resume
the Mdluli proceedings and had the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) file a complaint against the prosecutor responsible for dropping the charges.103
Another flexing of judicial muscle concerned political appointees
heading the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), an organization responsible for instituting and conducting criminal proceedings on behalf of the
State.104 The Constitutional Court invalidated the tenure of Menzi Simelane as head of the NPA, describing President Zuma’s appointment as “irrational” given clear evidence of Simelane’s dishonesty.105 Furthermore, the
Constitutional Court dismissed personal relationships as a proper justification to overlook specific credentials of a political appointee, potentially
adding a reasonableness criterion to the appointment of certain government employees.106
The landmark case that imposes limitations on executive discretion in
the enforcement of anti-corruption legislation is Glenister v. President of the
Republic of South Africa and Others.107 The case vindicates combating corruption as a national priority, embracing South Africa’s ratified international treaties as viable sources for enforcing the South African
government’s obligations to run independent anti-corruption agencies.
The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO, or “Scorpions”), an independent department housed within the NPA, contained a combination of investigative and prosecutorial functions that contributed “to the motivation
employed by the government to restructure the DSO which effectively led to
its dissolution in 2009.”108 In 2005, President Mbeki convened the
Khampepe Commission to review concerns about the Scorpions’ operaMr[.] Zuma, alleging a plot by senior party members to remove him as leader of the
ruling African National Congress” to secure Zuma’s loyalty).
102. Kutner, supra note 95.
103. See id.
104. See generally About the NPA, THE NAT’L PROSECUTING AUTH. OF S. AFR., https://
www.npa.gov.za/node/8.
105. See Democratic Alliance v. President of South Africa and Others 2013 (1) SA 248
(CC) at paras. 86– 88 (S. Afr.) (“The President too should have been alerted by the
adverse findings of the Ginwala Commission against Mr[.] Simelane and ought to have
initiated a further investigation for the purpose of determining whether real and important questions had been raised about Mr[.] Simelane’s honesty and conscientiousness.”);
Kutner, supra note 95.
106. See Democratic Alliance v. President of South Africa and Others 2013 (1) SA 248
(CC) at para. 88 (S. Afr.) (concluding that President Zuma should have initiated further
investigation into Menzi Simelane’s credentials “despite his knowledge of Mr[.] Simelane
as a person”). Simelane, however, was replaced by Nomgcobo Jiba, who was suspended
from the NPA for trying to block the prosecution of disgraced former police commissioner Jackie Selebi, thus exemplifying the limits of judicial policing of executive appointees without further reform. See Kutner, supra note 95.
107. Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347
(CC) (S. Afr.).
108. Naidoo, supra note 91, at 13.
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tions, which created many cases implicating ANC politicians, including the
SAPS commissioner and Jacob Zuma (President of the ANC Congress at
the time).109 Zuma’s transferring of the DSO to the South African Police
Service’s jurisdiction— and relabeling the unit as the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI, or “Hawks”)— thus effectively eliminated the
unit’s independence because of its newfound accountability to an ANCappointed commissioner. The unnecessary reforms to the most effective
anti-corruption unit in South Africa spurred public criticism alleging that
the ANC translucently acted to protect senior officials from being investigated for corrupt practices.110
The Glenister court determined that “failure on the part of the state to
create a sufficiently independent anti-corruption entity infringes . . . the
rights to equality, human dignity, freedom, security of the person, administrative justice and socio-economic rights” because corruption erodes the
rights asserted in the Bill of Rights and the duties imposed on the State in
section 7(2) of the Constitution.111 The State’s obligation to create an
independent anti-corruption entity is “constitutionally enforceable” by the
court because “it is sourced from our legislation and from our domesticated international obligations and is therefore an intrinsic part of the
Constitution itself [through section 231] and the rights and duties it creates.”112 Notably, the court’s holding placed an emphasis on the terms of
international agreements, construing that the State’s international obligation to create a domestic independent anti-corruption entity derived from
“the careful way in which the Constitution itself creates concordance and
unity between the Republic’s external obligations under international law,
and their domestic legal impact” through sections 39(1)(b) and 7(2).113
The majority summarized its position by stating, “the statutory framework
creating the DPCI offends the constitutional obligation resting on Parliament to create an independent anti-corruption entity, which is both intrinsic to the Constitution itself and which Parliament assumed when it
approved the relevant international instruments, including the UN Convention [Against Corruption].”114
The court also provided criteria to evaluate an agency’s independence
within its rejection of the ANC’s indirect dismantling of the Scorpions. The
two most egregious limitations placed on the DPCI were “the absence of
secure tenure protecting the employment of the members of the entity and
in the provisions for direct political oversight of the entity’s functioning.”115 DPCI members need special protection to mitigate potential
threats from senior officers when undertaking politically unpopular inves109. Melea Lewis & Philip Stenning, Considering the Glenister Judgment: Independence
Requirements for Anti-Corruption Institutions, 39 S. AFR. CRIME QUART. 11, 12 (2012),
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/sacq/article/viewFile/101418/90605.
110. Naidoo, supra note 91, at 14.
111. Glenister 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at paras. 198– 200.
112. Id. at para. 197.
113. See id. at para. 201.
114. Id. at para. 248 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at para. 213.
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tigations or prosecutions.116 The court opined, “[T]he power of the Ministerial Committee to determine guidelines appears to be untrammelled. . . .
[S]enior politicians are given competence to determine the limits, outlines
and contents of the [DPCI’s] work. That in our view is inimical to independence.”117 The extensive power senior politicians wielded created a conflict of interest, which inevitably stymied the agency’s work and thus
eradicated its required independence.
Through these recent adjudications, the Constitutional Court has
accentuated anti-corruption enforcement as a national priority while taking steps to mitigate unhindered patronage and executive discretion. The
judicial interpretation of international treaties lends another tool by which
the South African government may create affirmative obligations— in giving meaning to provisions in the Constitution and Bill of Rights— to
strengthen its institutions in the face of antithetically entrenched ANC politicians and their executive discretion.118
IV. Combatting Corruption En Masse
A.

The South Africa Constitution and Incorporation of International
Law

The South Africa Constitution section 39(1) states: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal, or forum . . . (b) must consider
international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.”119 It later reads,
“Customary International law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”120 These constitutional provisions, and others similarly apparent in fellow African countries
like Kenya and Zambia, underscore South Africa’s understanding that there
is a need for common international solutions to solve universal crises in
the context of globalization, liberalization, and regionalism.121 Such realizations have encouraged African nations to incorporate aspects of international and foreign law where courts have determined it is necessary to
“promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights,”122 in manners not inconsistent with the countries’ own interpretations. Incorporation of international law equips the South African courts with tools to
enforce more strictly international principles asserted through treaties and
116. See id. at para. 226.
117. Id. at paras. 230– 34.
118. “The courts are critical monitors of legality of governmental actions, which no
lawful government acting in good faith should seek to evade . . . . The judiciary must be
allowed to exercise its constitutional functions, including the power of judicial review of
executive and legislative acts, which is necessary for democratic governance.”
Udombana, supra note 18, at 1272– 73.
119. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(1) (emphasis added).
120. Id. § 232.
121. See Charles Manga Fombad, Internationalization of Constitutional Law and Constitutionalism in Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 439, 440 (2012).
122. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(2).
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conventions where domestic action fails to yield satisfactory results.123
The effect of these South African constitutional provisions is that
“instruments which contain rules considered to be customary international law are automatically applicable in . . . South Africa[ ] as part of
national law and must therefore be taken into account in any interpretation
of the constitution.”124 When considering international law within interpretation of the South Africa Constitution, courts are required to consult
all sources of law that are recognized by article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.125 Such explicit references to international
and foreign law within the Constitution warrant a more progressive
approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation, especially in a
newly democratic country with developing bureaucratic institutions.
Countries, like South Africa, containing high levels of corruption are
motivated to sign international treaties because “international donor agencies and organizations, including the World Bank, European Union, and
International Monetary Fund, emphasize good governance as a predicate
for cooperation with, or assistance to, African countries.”126 More
recently, however, there are constitutional arguments that South Africa may
be obligated to give more force to its international agreements pertaining to
corruption because the siphoning off of government money, otherwise
earmarked for the citizenry, prevents the State from “tak[ing] reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation” of rights like healthcare, food, water, and housing—
which are all enunciated in the Constitution.127 Corruption’s innate draining of the pool of available resources128 may jeopardize the government’s
123. See Fombad, supra note 121, at 464 (“The fact that many constitutions expressly
or implicitly provide for references to international or foreign law combined with the
growing convergence of constitutional law principles and standards necessitates a more
liberal and progressive approach to constitutional adjudication.”); Glenister v. President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) (S. Afr.).
124. Fombad, supra note 121, at 445. Furthermore, South Africa has a duty to further a good faith effort to embody the standards to which they have contracted in signing international treaties, decrees, declarations, and agreements. See Eustace Chikere
Azubuike, The Place of Treaties in International Investment, 19 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP.
L. 155, 176– 78 (2013) (“[T]he principle of pacta sunt servanda . . . has been described
by the International Law Commission as ‘the fundamental principle of the law of treaties’. . . . [I]t is not merely consent that binds the State but the legal system that makes it
mandatory for a State not to dishonor its consensual obligation.”). See also S. AFR.
CONST., 1996, § 233 (“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.”).
125. Hoffman, supra note 26, at 110 (listing available sources of law in article 38(1),
including international conventions, international customs, the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations, and judicial decisions).
126. See Oko, supra note 3, at 187.
127. This is a recurring phrase utilized within the Constitution in reference to the
government’s obligations to fulfill certain socio-economic rights. See S. AFR. CONST.,
1996, §§ 26, 27 (emphasis added).
128. See Kutner, supra note 95 (“A special federal investigating unit estimates that
South Africa loses about $3 billion annually to corruption and fraud.”); Taylor, supra
note 59 (“The public sector has become a cash-cow for a political elite rather than a
provider of good public services.”).
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ability to give effect to the positive obligations imposed by the Constitution, while simultaneously violating the State’s negative obligation not to
interfere with the exercise of civil, political, and socio-economic rights.
B.

South Africa in the World: The Big Four Conventions

South Africa is currently a party to four major conventions: The
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the African
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC),
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Anti-Bribery Convention (OECDABC), and the Southern Africa Development Community Protocol Against Corruption (SADCPAC). Following the
Constitutional Court’s reasoning in Glenister, these four international conventions’ principles and tangible goals may be constitutionally enforceable
and have a domestic legal impact based on the Constitution’s careful wording. Thus, closer examination of the conventions may provide grounds for
strengthening certain anti-corruption apparatuses in the country.
1.

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)

UNCAC is the most expansive international agreement combating corruption worldwide, binding 172 state parties, including South Africa as of
November 22, 2004.129 The document requires all signatories to adopt
domestic provisions to strengthen measures for combatting corruption;
facilitating international cooperation; and promoting integrity, accountability, and proper management of public affairs and property.130 The allencompassing convention holds countries accountable to implement
domestic measures to prevent numerous types of corruption (including
money laundering and conflicts of interest) by codifying provisions to
weaken corruption’s deleterious effects: public management of public
finances, legal disclosure requirements, international cooperation, asset
recovery, technical assistance, and information exchange. Signatories even
acknowledge that corruption’s crippling negative externalities disproportionately affect the poor.131 UNCAC considers corruption to be a “transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making
international cooperation to prevent and control it essential.”132 Beyond
these doctrinal assertions, the United Nations expressly outlines obliga129. United Nations Convention Against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as
of September 5, 2014, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, https://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.
130. United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 7, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349
U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter UNCAC], https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
131. See id. at iii (“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds
intended for development, undermining a Government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice and discouraging foreign aid and investment.
Corruption is a key element in economic underperformance and a major obstacle to
poverty alleviation and development.”).
132. Id. at pmbl. (emphasis added).
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tions for signatories to implement practices that give effect to bureaucratic
transparency and accountability.
UNCAC mandates that each state must establish independent anti-corruption bodies and install an accountable rule of law133— this is the duty
that is enforced by the Constitutional Court in Glenister.134 Another key
provision requires each state to “adopt, maintain and strengthen systems
for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants and . . . other non-elected public officials,” based on efficiency, transparency, and merit, and performed through proper selection and training
procedures.135 UNCAC contemplates the procurement and management
of public finances by requiring governments to distribute information publicly regarding procedures for the awarding of government contracts, the
use of objective criteria in selections, and the implementation of effective
domestic review and appeal systems.136 The domestic transparency overhaul includes having signatories periodically publish information about
administrative practices, as well as institute procedures to allow the general
public access to information detailing the government’s decision-making
process.137
UNCAC further restricts relationships between the private and public
sectors by obligating states to prevent conflicts of interest “by imposing
restrictions . . . on the professional activities of former public officials or
on the employment of public officials by the private sector,” where the
activities relate to officials’ public sector duties during their tenure.138
Concerning those public officials who are convicted of committing corrupt
acts, UNCAC advocates for States to establish procedures to disqualify perpetrators from holding public office or office in a State-owned enterprise
for a period of time.139 Beyond these specific provisions, UNCAC encourages States to adopt domestic legislation and agencies to characterize various forms of corruption as criminal offenses, and to provide the means to
prosecute and prevent such corruption.140
2.

OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECDABC)
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Anti-

133. See id. at art. 5, 9– 10.
134. See supra Part III.B. The duty to maintain an independent law enforcement body
that specializes in combating corruption is detailed further in UNCAC, supra note 130,
at art. 36.
135. UNCAC, supra note 130, at art. 7, 10 (attempting to limit patronage, cronyism,
and conflicts of interest in government).
136. See id. at art. 9, 12 (emphasis added).
137. See id. at art. 10, 13.
138. See id. at art. 12, 14. If South Africa effectively implemented this regulation, this
would give rise to violations against members of the Department of Mineral Resources
who were “sold” an ownership stake in the Gold Fields BEE deal.
139. Id. at art. 23, 30. This expands beyond the B-BBEE Amendment’s new restrictions by removing crooked politicians from the desirable patronage network within the
government.
140. See id. at art. 65 (“Each State Party shall take the necessary means . . . to ensure
the implementation of its obligations under this Convention.”).
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Bribery Convention builds on the foundation laid by UNCAC,141 offering
more subjective guidelines in some corruption topics. The OECDABC
urges enterprises to adjust customary due diligence practices by “taking
into account the particular bribery risks facing the enterprise,” like geographical and industrial sectors of operation.142 It also mentions that
States should maintain appropriate oversight of agents to ensure that remuneration is for legitimate services only, going so far as to produce lists of
agents engaged in connection with public bodies and State-owned enterprises for easy production to the authorities.143 The Council Recommendation suggests that member countries revisit the adequacy of external
audit requirements on companies, taking measures to assure independence
and proper reporting procedures.144
The Council Recommendation pushes government agencies to incorporate appropriate internal company controls, ethics, and compliance programs when making decisions for granting “public advantages, including
public subsidies, licences, [and] public procurement contracts.”145 It also
specifically notes that enterprises should “[n]ot make illegal contributions
to candidates for public office or to political parties or to other political
organisations.”146 Thus far, South Africa has failed to implement the
reforms expressed in OECDABC according to a March 2014 report published by Transparency International, which indicated that South Africa
has never initiated a single prosecution involving foreign bribery.147 Such
reforms, however, potentially provide further means for courts to limit corruptive practices.

141. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (OECD), Recommendation of the Council for
Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at pmbl. (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf
[hereinafter Council Recommendation] (“Recognising that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) are mutually
supporting and complementary.”).
142. Combating Bribery, Bribe Solicitation and Extortion, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES para. 4 (2011), https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/2011Combat
tingBribery,BribeSolicitation&Extortion.pdf.
143. Id. Appropriate oversight could come from a variety of mechanisms, for example
by requiring that State agents provide tax returns, account for discretionary decisions,
and disclose conflicts of interest from political or familial connections.
144. Council Recommendation, supra note 141, at (X)(B)(i)– (ii). This could be more
stringently enforced in South Africa to invalidate the B-BBEE Amendment’s relaxation of
required external auditing requirements for QSEs and EMEs, which could breed corruption in motivated companies that abuse such leniency. See discussion supra Part II.C.
145. See Council Recommendation, supra note 141, at (X)(C)(vi).
146. Combating Bribery, Bribe Solicitation and Extortion, supra note 142, at para. 7.
This is especially important in South Africa where “it is ‘routine’ for government officials to guide companies to preferred partners under Black Economic Empowerment
ownership initiatives.” Millman, supra note 27 (quoting Beatrice Hamza Bassey, partner
at Hughes Hubbard & Reed’s global anti-corruption practice).
147. SA Failing to Implement OECD Convention, CORRUPTION WATCH (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/sa-failing-to-implement-oecd-convention/.
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Southern Africa Development Community Protocol Against Corruption
(SADCPAC)

Most tellingly, SADCPAC was enacted with an express purpose of
“strictly enforcing legislation against all types of corruption,”148 which
may be read as an intention for ratifying States to maintain an expansive
view of corruption measures in the context of domestic adjudication.
Besides outlining the basic contours of anti-corruption policy and stressing
its gravity, SADCPAC imputes affirmative obligations on signatories to
adopt preventative measures. The most important preventive measure contemplated by the SADC is the strengthening of systems of government procurement of goods and services “that ensure transparency, equity and
efficiency of such systems,”149 and serve as “deterrents to the bribery of
domestic public officials.”150 States Parties are obligated to harmonize
domestic policies and legislation to attain these anti-corruption goals.151
Otherwise, SADCPAC closely parallels the objectives and remedies outlined
by UNCAC and OECDABC.
4.

African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
(AUCPCC)

Similarly to UNCAC and the OECD, the AU contemplates strengthening independent national anti-corruption authorities and adopting measures to improve internal accounting and auditing “in particular, in the . . .
procurement and management of public goods and services.”152 The
AUCPCC also urges that States Parties “commit themselves” to establishing
an internal committee tasked with monitoring a code of conduct for public
officials, who must undergo training in ethics.153 Generally, the AUCPCC
echoes initiatives (such as adopting legislative and other measures to combat corruption at large, and fostering continental and international cooperation154) stated in the other three international conventions.
Given the international consensus that corruption is an issue that
requires transnational cooperation, South Africa should show more deference to its international agreements combatting corruption when considering how to apply anti-corruption standards to its domestic dilemmas. The
South Africa Constitution specifically contemplates incorporating interna148. SADC Protocol Against Corruption pmbl., (Aug. 14, 2001), http://
www.sadc.int/files/7913/5292/8361/Protocol_Against_Corruption2001.pdf.
149. See id. at art. 4(1)(b).
150. Id. at art. 4(1)(h). These initiatives require that companies maintain clean
accounting books and “have sufficient internal accounting controls to enable the law
enforcement agencies to detect acts of corruption.” See id.
151. See id. at art. 7(1).
152. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption art.
5(3)– (4), July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter AU Corruption Convention], http://
www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7786-file-african_union_convention_prevent
ing_combating_corruption.pdf. See discussion supra notes 143– 44 (arguing for application of more stringent auditing controls to BEE implementation).
153. See AU Corruption Convention, supra note 152, at art. 7(2).
154. See id. at art. 11, 19.
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tional law within its own legislative, executive, and judicial processes to
give full effect to the Bill of Rights. Corruption’s disproportionate negative
externalities on the poor also arguably invoke issues of “human dignity,
equality and freedom,” which the State is obligated to “respect, protect,
promote and fulfil[l]” by constitutional mandate.155 This interpretation
would furnish the courts with another justification to limit executive discretion for decisions that, while possibly legal in South African jurisprudence, would otherwise fail international standards for anti-corruption
measures given effect through the four conventions to which South Africa
is a party.
There are a number of provisions present within the four conventions
that afford South African courts an opportunity to expand the judiciary’s
role in policing unbridled discretionary executive powers. Domestic judicial enforcement of these provisions could radically alter the incentive system for companies like Gold Fields to comply with government threats in
awarding government contracts, while holding executives accountable for
their corrupt actions. Most importantly, these treaties provide South
Africa with the potential to empower citizens to monitor their government’s
actions where the ANC, or any future dominant political party, is unwilling
to deviate from the status quo.
Conclusion
South Africa finds itself at a crossroads following the death of its revolutionary leader, Nelson Mandela, a man who symbolized black empowerment within his idealism and reconciliation. Going on twenty years of
universal democracy, the nation still faces many of the same challenges it
did at the abrogation of Apartheid— both economically and politically.
Although parliamentary democracies have flourished throughout the
world, particularly in Europe and the traditional “West,” the effectively
combined powers of the executive and legislative branches in South
Africa’s dominant party democracy156 have armed endemically corrupt
ANC leaders with the means to sustain their unhindered practice of executive abuse behind the curtains of institutional memory.157 Despite Parliament’s efforts to pass new legislation to realize BEE principles beyond the
politically connected black elite, the B-BBEE Act, Codes, and MPRDA (and
their progeny) all provide enough ministerial or senior official discretionary powers for ANC leaders to convolute BEE-related objectives to the benefit of self-interested ANC members.
South Africa’s Constitution, uniquely borrowing from German,
155. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 7(1)– (2).
156. See A Look Back at National Election Results, supra note 17.
157. See Raymond Suttner, Party Dominance “Theory”: Of What Value?, 33 POLITIKON
277, 289 (2006) (arguing that the ANC may conflate state and party in various appointments where people do not necessarily merit such placements, thus impeding the functioning of bureaucratic institutions).
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French, and English models of constitutional law,158 was written more
than 200 years after the United States Constitution. Its framers understood
the dangerously polarized South African citizenry— socially, politically,
and economically— and included provisions that imposed positive obligations upon the government to consummate numerous socio-economic
rights that had previously been denied to the majority of its citizens. Furthermore, the framers prophetically understood that international norms
codified by treaties could serve as powerful tools to protect vulnerable citizens from a dominant political party in a country with a history of
authoritarianism.159
The strong and independent South African judiciary— following recent
adjudications that charged corrupt prosecutors, enforced political
appointee credentials against the President’s will, and imposed international standards to effectuate domestic anti-corruption obligations160— has
proven to be the most effective governmental branch in combatting corruption. By introducing meaning into the Constitution’s express provisions
for socio-economic rights and purposeful incorporation of international
law provisions, the courts have actualized the framers’ intent by circumventing legislative holes previously filled by ANC-controlled executive preferences. While most of the adjudications limiting executive discretion have
centered around corruption within law enforcement mechanisms, the same
justifications and constitutional arguments can be applied to realize citizens’ rights to express socio-economic rights. Corruption has proven to be
an endemic issue in South Africa that affects the government’s ability to
fund programs empowering citizens in every phase of life, thus necessitating stricter scrutiny from the courts, continued progress from legislature
bills, and responsible enforcement from the executive branch— beginning
with the President and his ministers.

158. See Fombad, supra note 121, at 466 (“The South African 1996 constitution is an
example of cross-systemic fertilization with borrowings from the English Westminster
model and the German and French civil law constitutional systems.”).
159. See discussion supra note 19.
160. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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Appendix
Figure 1:
B-BBEE Status

Level One Contributor

Old BBBEE
Codes

Amended B-BBEE
Codes

Point Required

Points Required

 100 points

 100 points

B-BBEE
Recognition
Level
135%

Level Two Contributor

 85 but < 100 points  95 but < 100 points 125%
Level Three Contributor  75 but < 85 points  90 but < 95 points 110%
Level Four Contributor

 65 but < 75 points

 80 but < 90 points

100%

Level Five Contributor

 55 but < 65 points

 75 but < 80 points

80%

Level Six Contributor

 45 but < 55 points

 70 but < 75 points

60%

Level Seven Contributor  40 but < 45 points
Level Eight Contributor  30 but < 40 points

 55 but < 70 points

50%

 40 but < 55 points
< 40 points

10%

Non-Complaint
Contributor

< 30 points

0%

Nicolene Schoeman-Louw, BBBEE Compliance: Why it is Relevant Now!, ENTREPRENEUR
MAG. (Aug. 14, 2014) http://www.entrepreneurmag.co.za/advice/doing-business-in-sa/
bee/bbbee-compliance-why-it-is-relevant-now/.

Figure 2:
Element
Ownership
Management Control
Skills Development
Enterprise and Supplier Development
Socio-Economic Development

Weighting
25 points
15 points
20 points
40 points
5 points

Code series reference
100
200
300
400
500

Codes of Good Practice, GN 1019 of GG 36928, § 8.1 (11 Oct. 2013), https://
www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/docs/code_gud_practice10102013.pdf.

